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TOPIC v. 
I~Il\IUXITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA. 
Should private property at sea be exempt £ron1 
capture? 
CONCLUSION. 
The United States 1nay "\vith propriety abandon the 
contention £or the general exmnption o£ enemy pri-
vate property at sea and seek agree1nent upon a certain 
list o£ exemptions -vvhich meet the approval o£ the states 
of the "\vorld and which may £rom time to time be ex-
panded as the sentiment for exemption becomes more 
general. · 
NOTES. 
Introduction.-A decision as to the treatment o£ pri-
Yate property at sea in time o£ war is in certain respects 
fundamental. A code o£ rules for the conduct o£ maritime 
warfare based on the right to capture private property 
vvould be materially modified by the prohibition o£ this 
rjght. The strategy o£ war "\Vould also probably be modi-
fied. The attempts to make private property immune 
from capture have not yet met with success, therefore, 
any rules drawn up may properly concede· the right o£ 
capture at sea o£ enemy private property. The con-
siderations advanced in regard to the exemption o£ pri-
vate property at sea should, however, receive attention. 
United States proposition at The Hag~te, 1899.-Under 
date of June 20, 1899, the American commission at the 
First Hague Conference presented a ·communication to 
the conference stating that they were instructed to place 
before the conference the following proposition: 
The privat~ property of all citizens or subjects of the signatory 
powers, with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt 
from capture or seizure on the high seas or elsewhere by the 
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armed vessels or by the military forces of any of the said signa-
tory poY\'ers. But nothing herein contained shall extend exemp-
tion from seizure to vess els and their cargoes which may attempt 
to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of any of the said 
powers. (Holls, Peace Conference at 'rhe I-Iague, p. 311.) 
Thjs 'vas signed by the commission, consjsting o:f An-
dre'v D. vVhite, Seth Lo,v, Stanford Newel, A. T. Mahan~ 
'Villiam Crozier, Frederick ,V. Rolls. 
The communication o:f the American commission 
showed that the attitude o:f the United States had been 
:favorable to the exemption o:f private property :from cap-
ture. The com1nittee o:f the conference did not :feel itself 
competent to take up the subject, but reco1nmended that 
it be included in the program o:f a :further conference. 
In speaking on this subject Mr. 'Vhite said in behalf o:f 
the }unerican com1nission: 
The commission ha Ye found severa: of the delegn tions ready to 
accept this proposal, and sundry others whose opinions evidently 
incline toward its adoption, but we have not succeeded in sec1.'1ring 
a support sufficiently unanimous to justify us in pressing the 
matter further during the present conference. (Ibid., 314.) 
Mr. White also 1nade quite an extended argtnnent :for 
the exen1ption, and the proposition 'vas inserted in the 
:forn1 of a 'vish in the Final Act o:f the First Hague Con-
ference, as :follows: 
5. The conference expresses the wish thu t the proposn 1. which 
contemplates the declaration of the inviolability of private prop-
erty in naval warfare, may be referred to a subsequent conference 
for consideration~ (Ibid., p. 379.) 
Capture or destruction of enemy JJJ ivate prope11(r; at 
sea.-Topic I considered at the Naval 'Var College Con-
ference in 1905 proposed the question, "vVhat regulations 
should be made in regard to private property at sea in 
time o:f vvar? " 
In the discussion o:f this topic the attitude o:f the 
United States 'vas traced :fron1 the early days o:f the 
Republic. It 'vas sho,vn that the attitude o:f the United 
States had usually been in :favor o:f the exen1ption o:f pri-
vate property at sea :fro1n capture. -
Fro In the general conclusions as to the policy o:f capture 
a :fevv citations 1nay be made. 
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There is a growiug opinion tlln t the ren sons for ca I>l ure of 
tlle enemy's pl'i va te property at sea are economic awl political 
rather thnn military. The immunity to lH'i vate property should 
uot, ho,vever, be so extended as to interfere with necessary mili-
tnry operations. It would not be reasonable to exempt private 
property to such an extent as to cause the war to be of neces-
sity prolonged or to result in greater destruction of life. Impera-
tlve military necessity, of which the superior officer on the fie1d 
of action at the time must judge, must m·erride rights of private 
property. The question of damages n1ay be reserved for subse-
quent settlement. ( Interna tiona I La·w Topics and Discussions, 
1905, p. 17.) 
The equitaule practice of days of grace will probably be con-
tinued. The use of improved means of communication will be 
extended. Privateering is abandoned. Prize money is beginning 
to be abolished. Land commerce is more and more developed. 
In time of 'var commerce is more easily transferred to neutral 
flags. 'I'he actual influence of the capture of private property 
does not seem to be great. The weakening of a naval force in 
order to pursue and capture private property is of doubtful ex-
pediency. Such considerations as these show why the tendency 
to guarantee the exemption of all private property at sea in 
tJme of 'var by an international agreen1ent has been looked upon 
with increasing favor. 
The proposed exemption, if it extended to all goods and prop-
E-rty, would probably make necessary an· extension of the list of 
contraband. Contraband as now used applies only to certain 
c-lasses of goods carried by or belonging to neutra1s. If enemy 
property is placed on the same basis as neutral property, the 
doctrine of contraband must be ~nterpretecl nccordingly and the 
principles en uncia ted with this in view. (Ibid., p. 19.) 
After lengthy discussion and considerable difference of 
opinion, it ·was found necessary in the conference of 1905 
to make so1ne special provision in regard to vessels. The 
brief statement 'vas as follo,vs: 
The vessels of the enemy used in commerce may be enemy pri-
vate property. Certain of these Yessels may readily become of 
great service to the enemy. Vessels of like character, if belong-
ing to a neutral, could not be classed as contraband. Owing to 
tbe ease with which many types of commercial vessels may be 
converted to warlike uses, it seems proper that such agencies of 
transportation should not be placed under the general exemption. 
The degree of exemption to be extended to vessels may prop-
(•rly be left to. the belligerents to determine. 
Considering the general conditions of modern naval warfare 
nnd commercial relations, as well as the trend of opinion, to-
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getiler with the exceptional character of private vessels belonging 
to enemy citizens, an attempt to formulate a proper regulation 
in regard to the exemption of private property at sea may be 
considered expedient. Of course such exemption does not cover 
r;roperty of_ contraband natur~, property involved in violation of 
blockade, property involved in unneutra1 service or otherwise con-
cerned directly in the war. Tile regulation of exemption should 
apply, therefore, only to innocent property and ships. 
Some such regulation in regard to vessels as the following 
seems to n1eet the requirements imposed by the above discussion 
~md conclusions : 
Innocent private silips, except belligerent -resse1s propelled by 
machinery and capable of keeping tile high seas, are not liable 
to cnpture. 
It nwy be said tiln t the word," innocent" npplies only to such 
t,rivnte property or shivs ns lwve no direct relation to or share 
i11 the Ilostilities. It may be nssumed that innocent belligerent 
goods or ships may be taken in case of military necessity, and 
when so tnken full remuneration sila1l be paid, nfter the nnalogy 
of similnr action on land. (Ibid .. p. 20.) 
' The proposed regulation in regard to the treatment of 
private property at sea was: 
Innocent neutral goods and ships are not liable to capture. 
Innocent enemy goods and ships, except vessels propelled by 
machinery and capable of keeping the high seas, nre not linble to 
capture. (Ibid., p. 20.) 
United States proposition at The Hague, 1907.-In ac-
cordance with the vote of the First Hague Conference as 
expressed in the " wish " of the final a:ct of the Confer-
ence, the immunity of private property at sea was in-
cluded in the program of the Second Hague Conference 
in 1907. The subject was referred to the fourth commit-
tee, and the American proposition was in ~lmost the same 
words as in 1899. 
Mr. Choate, on June 28, 1907, made a long speech re-
viewing the attitude of the United States upon the ques-
tion of inviolability o£ private property at sea. (Deux-
ieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III., 
pp. 750-764.) Mr.· Choate, representing the American 
delegation, speaks of the immunity of private property 
at sea, saying: 
This proposition involves a principle which has been advocated 
from the beginning by the Government of the United States and 
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urged by it upon other nations and which is most 'varmly cher-
ished by the American people, and the President is of opinion 
that whatever may be the apparent specific interest of our ow11 
or of any other country for the time being, the principle thus de-
clared is of such permanent and universal importance that no 
balancing of the chances of probable loss or gain in the immediate 
future on the part of any nation should be permitted to ~utweigh 
the considerations of common benefit to civilization which call 
for the adoption of such an agreement. (Deuxieme Conference 
Interna tionale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 766.) 
Mr. Choate also speaks of this doctrine as " our favor-
ite proposition," "the traditional policy of the United 
States," and at the same time saying, " I ought most 
frankly to concede that the United States has never been 
able to put this policy· into practical operation." Mr. 
Choate cites the opinion of statesmen and \vriters in favor 
of exemption and argues that the reasons for exmnptio11 
of private property on land apply to si1nilar property at 
sea. He -urges the exemption-
First, on humanitarian grounds; secondly, we place it on a 
ground more important still, of the unjustifiable interference with 
innocent and legitimate commerce, which concerns not alone the 
nation to which the ship belongs, but the who~e cidlizecl world. 
'Ve insist upon our proposition in the third place as a direct ad-
Yance toward the limitation of war to its proper province, a con· 
test between the armed forces of the States by land. and sea 
against each other and against the public property of the respec-
tive states ... engaged. And, finally, 've object to the old practice 
and insist upon our demand for its abolition on the ground that 
it is now no longer necessary, and that it tends to invite war 
and to provoke new wars as a natural result of its continuance. 
(Ibid., pp. 774-775.) 
Mr. Choate supports his position by arguments, some 
oi which have a bearing upon the military significance o£ 
this doctrine of exemption: 
Apart from all historical and ethical points of Yiew, it may well 
hP claimed that there is another strong ground in support of the 
immunity of private property at sea, not needed for military pur-
poses, for which we contend. From economical considerations 
it is no longer worth the while of maritime nations to construct 
and maintain ships of war for the purpose of pursuing merchant 
ships which haye nothing to do with the contest. The marked 
trend of naYal warfare among all great maritime nations at the 
present time is to dispense with armed ships adapted to such 
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service, antl to concentrate their entire resources upon the con-
struction of great hatt1eships whose encot1nters with thosE of 
their adversaries shall decide any. contest, thus conflcing wa1 a~ 
lt should be, to a test of strength between the armed i\n ~es and 
tbe financial resources of the combatants on sea and land. It is 
1:.robnb1e that. if the truth were known, there has been an actual 
diminution by all the maritime nations in the construction of 
\Yar vessels adapted to the pursuit of merchantmen. and, indeed. 
fl sale or breaking up of such vessels which had been for some 
time in service. Indeed. none of the great navies now existing 
could afford to employ any of their great and costly ships of war 
c>r cruisers in the paltry pursuit of merchantn1en scattered over 
the seas. 1 Tl~e game "·ould not be worth the candle and the ex-
pense would be more than any probable result. 
This 11resents in another form the idea a1ready referred to that 
\'\;ar has come to be, as it should be, a contest between the nations 
engaged and not between either nation and the noncombatant 
citizens or individuals of the other nation, and it results from it 
that the noncombatant citizens should be let alone, and that no 
amount of pressure that can be brought to bear upon them will 
l1a ve any serious effect in shortening the controversy. (Ibid., 
p. 777.) 
Of the proposition that the " most effective ·way of pre-
Yenting \Yar is to 1nake it as terrible as possible," Mr. 
Choate, after sho·wing that the trend of the Geneva and 
other conventions is in the opposite direction, says: 
Of course there is no truth or sanity in such a brutal sugges-
tion. Our duty is not to make war as horrible as possible, but 
to make it as harmless as possible to all who do not actually 
take part in it, to prevent as far as we can, to bring it to an end 
as speedily as we can, to n1itigate its evils as far as human 
ingenuity can accomplish that result, and to limit the engines and 
instruments of war to their legitimate use-the fighting of battles 
nnd the blockading and protection of seacoasts. (Ibid., p. 778.) 
Other arguments are also presented, and as these con-
stitute -vvhat is regarded as an official statement of the 
position of the United States, the paragraphs concluding 
Mr. Choate's address 1nay be cited: 
Again, it is urged that the retention of this ancient right of 
capture and detention is necessary as the only Ineans of bringing 
war to an end. That when you have destroyed the fleets of your 
enemy and conquered its arn1ies it has no object in suing for 
peace as long as its commerce and its conu11unica tion by trans-
portation with other nations in the way of trnde is left undisturbed. 
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But this seems to us to be n purely fanciful and imaginary 
proposition. The history of modern wars, and, in fact, of all 
w·ars, shows that the decisive victory over an enemy by the de-
struction of his fleets and the defeat of his armies is sure to bring 
about peace. The test of strength to which the parties appealed 
has thereby been decided and there is no further object in con-
tnluing the war. 
The picking up or destruction of a few harmless and helpless 
merchantmen upon the sea, will ba ve no appreciable effect in 
reducing the government and nation to which they belong to 
subjection, if the defeat of fleets and armies bas not accomplished 
that result. Besides, there is a limit to the legitimate right of 
even the victor upon the seas for -the time being to employ his 
power for purposes of destruction. Victory in naval battles is 
one thing, but ownership of the high seas is another. In fact, 
rightly considered, there is- no such tb~ng as ownership of the 
seas. According to the universal judgment and agreement of 
nations they have been and are always free seas-free for inno-
cent and unoffending trade and commerce. And in the interest 
of mankind in general they must always remain so. 
Again, it bas been urged that the power to strike at the mercan-
tile marine of other nations is a powerful factor in deterring them 
frmn war-that the merchants having such great interests in-
volved, Iiab~e to be sacrificed by the outbreak of war, will do 
their utmost to bold their government back from provoking to 
or engaging in hostilities. But this, we submit, is a very feeble 
motive. Comn1erce and trade are always opposed to war, but 
have little to do with causing or preventing it. The vindication 
of national honor, accident, passion, the lust of conquest, revenge 
for supposed affront, are the causes of war, and the c01pmercial 
interests which would be put in jeopardy by it have seldom, if 
ever, been persuasive to prevent it. 
And as to its continuance or termination, commerce really bas 
nothing to do with it. When the military and financial strength 
of one side is exhausted the war, according to modern methods, 
must come to an end, and the noncombatant merchants and 
traders have no more to do with bringing about the consu1nmation 
than the clergymen and schoolmasters of a nation. 
Once more, it is said that the bloodless capture of merchant 
ships and their cargoes is the most humane and barn1less enl-
ployment of military force that can be exercised, and that in view 
of the community of interest in comn1erce to which we have 
referred and the practice of insurance in distributing the loss, the 
effect of such captures upon the general sentiment and feeling of 
the nation to \Vhich they belong is 1nost effective as a means of 
persuading their government to make peace. 
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But we reply that bloodless though it be H is still the extreme 
of oppression and injustice practiced upon unoffencling and inno-
cent indiYiduals, and that it has no nppreciable effect in reaching 
or compelling the action of the GoYernment of 'Yhich the sufferers 
are subjects. 
We appeal, then, to our fellow delegates assembled here from 
all nations in the interest of peace, for the prevention of war, and 
the mitigation of its evils to take this important subject into se-
rious consideration, to study the arguments that will be presented 
for and against this proposition, which has already enlisted the 
sympathy and support of the people of mnny nations, to be 
guided not wholly by the individual interest of the nations that 
they represent, but to determine what shall be f01· the best inter-
est of all the nations in general and whether commerce, which is 
the nurse of peace and international amity, ought not to be pre-
served and protected, although it nuly require from a few nations 
the concession of the remnnnt of an ancient right, the chief value 
of which has long since been extinguished. 
In the consideration of such a question, the interest of neutrals, 
who constitute at all times the great majority of the nations, 
ought to be first considered, and if they will declare on this occa-
sion their adhesion to the humane and beneficent proposition 
which we have offered, we may rest assured that, although we 
may fail of unanimous agreen1ent, such an expression of opinion 
will represent the general judgment of the world and will tend 
to dissuade those of us who may become belligerents fron1 any 
further exercise of this right, which is so abhorrent to every prin-
ciple of justice and fair play. (Ibid., p. 778-779.) 
Replies to the American proposition, 1907.-The recep-
tion of Mr. Choate's address ·was most cordial, though not 
all the delegations were able to accept its conclusions. 
Some offered reasons of policy, others offered reasoned 
arguments. While political reasons were not supposed to 
influence the deliberations, it is evident that national con-
ditions could not be disregarded. 
A Colombian delegate concluded a considerable discus-
sion of Mr. Choate's address with the following words: 
Pour en finir, ~Iessieurs, nous n'acceptons pas la proposition de 
M. Choate parce que nos conditions et nos circonstances ne nous 
pern1ettent pas ce beau luxe en fa Yeur des principes abstraits de 
la justice et de l'hu1nanite. On l)eut etre apotre et chercher le 
martyre individuellement; quand on represente un pays, on a le 
devoir de defendre ses interets; dans le cas present,_ il s'agit de 
politique internationale et non pas de philanthropie. (DenxH~1ne 
Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 792.) 
1~1 
l\1. Renault, of the l~rench delegation, maintained that 
the analogy bebYeen 'var on land and on sea 'vas not coin~ 
plete, that the disturbance of the econo1nic life of the 
con1n1unity by capture of 1nerchant ships " 'as a means of 
coercion 'v hich might prevent 'var or hasten peace, and 
one could not say it 'vas in a high degree inhumane. As 
the ships n1ay easily be conyerted into 'var vessels, they 
may constitute a potential 1neans of defense the loss of 
'vhich would hasten the close of hostilities. M. Renault 
was opposed to the ancient idea of prize money. He 
closes his address as follo·ws: 
D'autre part, c'est clans }'interet general de l'Etat en meme 
t~mps que dans le leur que 1es arrnateurs et chargeurs des 
rwYires captures ont continue leurs operations rnalgre la guerre. 
Il ne serait done pas juste qu'ils subissent seuls les consequences 
de la capture. Aussi l'idee que l'Etat, dan son ensemble, doit subir 
les consequences prejudiciables de la guerre non seulement en tant 
qu'elles se sont produites directernent contre l'Etat lui-meme et 
ses etablissements, rnais encore en tant qu'elles ont atteint les 
particuliers, s'affirme de plus en plus; on peut differer sur les 
moyens de la realiser, mais i1 n'y a guere de doute sur le principe 
lui-meme. 
Si ces considerations sont, connne nou~ le croyons, justes, le 
droit de capture apparait comrne nne mesure dirigee par un Etat 
belligerant contre un autre Etat belligerant, cette mesure faisant 
partie de !'ensemble des operations par lesquelles un Etat s'efforce 
de reduire son adversaire a composition et n'ayant par elle-menle 
aucun caractere particulier de rigueur. Il n'y a done pas, suivant 
nous, de raison suffisante pour y renoncer, tant que l'entente neces-
saire a laquelle nous ayons fait allusion au debut eta la formation 
de laquelle nons sommes prets a concourir, ne se sera pas realisee. 
(Ibid., p. 794.) 
Sir Edward Fry, of the English delegation, said: 
J e demande la parole seulement sur un sujet de nos deb a ts. Le 
DeH~gue americain que nous venons d'entendre ayec tant d'interet 
a beaucoup parle de la cruaute de l'exercice du droit de capturer 
la propriete privee. A rnon avis c'est un rnal-entendu. Il est 
vrai que dans toutes les or)erations de la guerre, il y a quelque 
chose de barbare, rnais de toutes les operations il n'y en a pas 
une qui soit aussi humaine que l'exercice de ce droit. Considerez, 
je vous prie, ces deux cas: l'un, Ia capture d'un yaisseau marchand 
sur mer; l'autre, les operations d'une armC>e ennemie. Dans le 
premier cas . .;,ous yoyez une force majeure contre laquelle il est 
impossible de combattre; personne n'est tue, rneme personne n'est 
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blesse; c'est nne affaire pacifique. De l'autre cote, qu'est-ce 
que vous voyez? Vous voyez le terrain desole, le betail detruit, 
les maisons brulees, les femmes et les enfants fuyant devant les 
soldats ennemis et Jleut-etre des horreurs sur lesquelles je vou-
drais garder le silence. Se plaindre done de la capture des vais-
sea ux marcllands sur mer, et ne pas interdire la guerre sur terre, 
c'est choisir le plus grand des deux n1aux. (Ibid., p. 800.) 
rrhe delegate fron1 the Argentine Republic took a simi-
lar position. (Ibid, p. 810.) 
Position of }l etherlands, 1907.--The Nether lands posi-
tion in the Second Hague Conference was that it shared 
fully the sentiments and adhered to the principles of 
inviolability of private property as set forth by the 
A1nerican delegation: 
La delegation des Pays-Bas est favorable a toute proposition 
etablissnnt le principe de l'inviolabilite de la propriete privee sue 
mer. 
Afin que la possilJilite de transformer en temps de guerre des 
navires de commerce en croiseurs auxilinres ne puisse etre un 
motif pour ne pas accepter ce principe, la delegation soumet aux 
eonsiclern ti: ns de la Commission la proposition suivante: 
Ancnn nnvire marclland ne pent etre capture par une partie . 
belligerante pour Je seul fait de naviguer sous pavilion ennemi 
s' il est muni cl'un passeport delivre par l'autorite competente de 
son pays, dans lequel passeport il est declare que le navire ne 
sera pa s transforme en va isseau de guerre ni utilise comme tel 
vendant toute la duree de la guerre. (Deuxieme Conference Inter-
nationale de la Paix, 'l'ome III, p. 1142.) 
B razil.- The Brazilian delegation 'vas favorable to as-
siinilating the status of private property at sea to the 
status of private property on land. He refers in his 
proposition to the articles of The Hague convention rela-
tive to the la,vs and customs of war on land: 
B. Lor sque Je capitaine d'un navire ou d'une flotte belligerante se 
t rouvera dans la necessite de requisitionner, dans le cas prevu 
a l'article 23, lettre g, de la susmentionne c~mvention, c'est-a-
dire dans Je cas ou 1a destruction ou la saisie de ces biens lui 
sont commandees par les exigences les plus in1perieuses de la 
guerre , un vaissen u de commerce ennemi, sa cnrgaison, ou nne 
portion quelconque de celle-ci, la requisition sera constatee par 
celui qui Ja fait moyennant des re~us delivres au .capitaine du 
vaisseau qn 'on aura snisi, ou dont on aura saisi les marchandises, 
avec tons les details possibles pour assurer nux parties interes-
sfes leur droit a une jtlste indeminite. 
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C. Cette clause s'apvlique nux warchmHli:.;cs lH'utres, qui sc 
trouYeron t :1 n bord des Yaissea ux ma rchands ennemis requisi-
tiones. 
Le cnpitane du IUlYire ou <lela flotte de guerre, qui aura deter-
mine In requisition, est tenu <le fa ire mettre a terre, dans Ull des 
ports les pins proches, les officiers et !'equipage dn ba timent sn isi, 
:tYee Ies ressources necessaireR 11otn· leur retour au vays n uquel H 
a ppa rtena it. 
Denn~a;·lc.-Deninark "Was in favor of exen1ption if it 
conld be by co1nmon agree1nent. 
B elgiu1n.-The Belgian delegate subn1itted a set of 
rules "Which had in vie"w that private vess.els of the ene1ny 
could be seized and retained by a belligerent, bnt 'vere to 
be restored at the close of hostilities. The crews of such 
vessels ·were to be liberated on condition that they would 
take no part in the war. 
France.-The French delegation, ad1nitting that 'var 
'vas not for the profit of individuals and that the loss 
should not be borne by individuals, sho,ved a disposition 
to accept the American proposition in case of unani1nity. 
The delegation 1nade a reasoned proposition: 
Considerant que, si le droit des gens positif admet encore la 
legitime du droit de capture applique a la propriete privee ennemie 
sur mer, il est eminemn1ent desirable que, jusqu'a ce que l'entente 
puisse s'etablir entre les Etats au sujet de sa suppression, l'exer-
cice en soit subordonne a certaines modalites. 
Considerant qu'il import an plus haut point que, conformement 
a Ia conception moderne de 1a guerre qui doit etre dirigee contre 
Ies Eta ts et non contre Ies particuliers, Ie droit de prise ap11araisse 
nniquement comme un moyen de coercition pratique par un Etat 
contre un autre etat; 
Que, dans cet or_der d'idees, tout benefice particulier au profit 
des agents de l'I~ta t qui exercent Ie droit de prise devrait etre 
exclu et que les pertes subies par les }mrticnliers de chef des prises 
deYraient finnlement incomber a l'Etat dont ils reieYent. 
La Deiegn tion fran~aise n l'honneur de proposer a la Qua trH~me 
Commission d'emettre le vreu que les etats qui exerceront le 
droit de capture suppriment les part de IH'ises a ttribnees a nx 
equipages des batiments capteurs et prennent 1es mesures neces-
saires pour que les pertes ca usees pnr l'exercice dn droit de prise 
ne restent pas entieren1ent a la charge des varticuliers dont Ies 
hiens auront ete cnptures. (Ibid., p. 1148.) 
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.. ll ustria-Hungary.- The 1\nstro-llnngarian delegation 
proposed amendments to the :B..,rench fonn: 
Animee du vif desir de Yoir terminer la discussion de la Qua-
t rieme Commission sur l'inviolabilite de la propriete privee 
ennemie sur mer par une amelioration, si legere fftt-elle, de l'etat 
actuel, et estimant que le vreu propose par la Delegation fran~aise 
renferme des elements propres a arriver a. ces finR, mais tennant 
compte toutefois de certaines objections que ce vreu lui semble 
a voir rencontre de la part d'un nombre considerable des membres 
cle cette Commission, la Delegation d'Autriche-Hongrie a l'hon-
neur de proposer les" arnendements suiyants dans le texte emis 
par la Delegation de France: 
(a) mettre a pres " que les " au lieu de "Etats qui exerceront 
le droit de capture " les mots : " Puissances qui maintiennent Ia 
faculte de faire des prises " ; 
(b) a la place de " prennent les mesures necessaires" in serer 
les mots: " s'occupent a chercher un moyen praticable"; et 
( c) a u lien de " du droit de prises " mettre "de cette faculte.'' 
R esu1ne of The Hague propositions, 1907.-The presi-
dent of the commission having the subject of the in1-
Inunity of private property at sea under consideration 
at The Hague in 1907 ·was 1\IL de Martens, a ?killed and 
experienced Russian diplomat. He endeavored to give 
a resu1ne of the various propositions and arguments ad-
vanced before the commission. At the 1neeting of July 
·17, 1907, he spoke to the follo ·wing effect: 
La provosi tion an1ericaine a suscite bea ucoup d'a utres proposi-
tions ; la question a ete posee en 1899, elle a ete alors etudiee 
pnr la Premiere Conference sous benefice cl'in ventaire; huif annees 
-sc sont passees depuis. on a done eu le temps de se vreparer sur 
la question qui semble aujourd'hui epuisee. II est inconte~table, 
a raison des propositions intermediaires qui ont ete deposees. que 
l'applicn tion clu principe de l'inviolabilite de la propriete privee 
sur mer ne reunit pas l'nnanimite des suffrages; ce n'est pas a 
la Commission qu'il appartient de cliscuter les motifs qui peuvent 
faire vnloir les differents Gouvernements, mais il n'en est pas 
moins vrai qui sur cette question on rencontre des hesitations, des 
scruples et meme des craintes. Les Etats ont evidemment !'appre-
hension d'npporter une solution dont 1es consequences leur sont 
inconnnes ; d'entrer dans les tenebres. De nombreux auteurs ont 
ecrit sur le principe de l'inviolabilite de la propriete sur mer; 
il s sont loin d'etre d'accord entre eux, meme · s'ils appartien-
nent an meme vays. Le President rapel1e qu'on a cite l'ouvrage 
qn'i1 a (•crit i1 y a qunrnnte ans; i1 etait alors le partis~n1 con-
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YllhlCU de l'inYiolabilite, mais uepui~ cette longue epoque i1 est 
deYenu plus circonspect sur cette question delicate. 
Les faits historiques qui viennent a l'appui de la these ameri-
cnine, snggerent quelques observations. Le traite que la Prusse 
signa aYec les Etats-Unis on 1785 a consacre le priricipe rle l'invio-
labilite, mais il faut se rapeller que ce traite fut signe par un 
Hoi philosophe et un Prince parmi les philosophes, qui du reste 
n~avaient guere d'illusions sur la portee pratique de leur accord, 
car ils sa vaient to us les deux qu'une guerre entre leurs deux 
pqys n'etait guere probable. On a encore cite une depeche qui 
fut addressee en 1824 a l\1. M:ittleton, ministre des Etats-Unis a 
·Petersbourg et dans laquelle le Comte Nesselrode exprimait toutc~ 
sa sympathie pour le principe de l'inviolabilite de la propriete 
prives sur mer. 
l\1ais il faut prendre aussi en consideration la depeche, datant 
de la meme epoque, ou le Comte Nesselrocle, ecrivant au Comte 
Pozzo di Borgo, ambassadenr de Russie a Paris, exclut l'even-
tualite d'un engagement ferme dans nne question grosse de con-
sequences qu'on ne pourrait pas aisen1ent calculer. En 1856, le 
Prince Gortchakoff a egalement exprime son energique sympathie 
pour !'abolition de la capture, mais, lui anssi, a entrevu les 
difficultes qu'elle suscitait. 
Depuis 1785 jusqu'a aujourd'hui, le principe que discute la Com-
mission n'a ete mis qu'une fois en application, pendant la guerre 
entre la Prusse, l'Italie et l' A utriche en 1866. Ces Puissances 
ont declare au moncle qn'il n'y aurait pas de capture des navires 
de commerce. mais cette guerre a ete d'une si courte duree 
qu'elle ne peut etre citee comme un precedent. L'argument le plus 
concluant que l'on a mis en avant a ete la difference du regime 
qui pendant la guerre regit la propriete sur terre et la propriete 
sur n1er, mais cet argument repose sur un malentendu. La Con-
ference de 1899 a fonde, pour ainsi dire, nne societe d'assnrances 
mutuelles contre les abus de la force pendant la guerre sur terre; 
neanmoins si on les compare avec ceux de la guerre sur mer. ils 
sont bien plus terribles. Que le territoire soit on ne soit pas 
occupe par l'ennemi, quoique le pillage soit aujourd'hui interdit, 
les necessites n1ilitaires que reconnaissent les articles 47, 48, etc., 
de la Convention de 1899, pesent d'un poids tres lourd sur le 
paysan comme sur le proprietaire, eHes les infligent non seule-
ment des souffrances morales mais des souffrances materielles 
que les conT"entions ne peuyent pas supprimer au moment ou la 
force prime le droit meme. Si l'on n'admet pas le principe de 
l'inviolabilite de la proprH~te priYee sur mer, les particuliers ont 
de nombreux moyens pour echapper aux consequences de la 
guerre; ils peuyent notamment vendre leurs nayires et les recon-
struire a la fin des hostilites. Leur situation deyiendra bien plus 
favorable si l'on supprime le droit de capture; elle sera meme 
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vrivilegiee, vnh.;que leurs affaires augmenteront et se feront au 
detriment <.les entreprises continentales paralysees par l'invasion. 
O'est a la Commission cl'examiner sons tous ses cotes la decision 
qu'ele va prendre en se conformant aux instructions que le~ 
Delegues ont re~ues de leurs Gouvernernents. 
Le Presillent termin0 ainsi son discours: 
Tel est, :Messieurs, l'expose impartial de toute la question sur 
laquelle vous allez vous prononcer. En vous presentant cet 
€·xpose des faits historiques et cles considerations docurnentees, 
je n'avais nulle1nent !'intention ni d'influencer votre vote, ni de 
me prononcer personnellement contre la prise en cosicleration cle 
la proposition (Annexe 10) de ln Delegation des Etats-Unis 
<.!_'Amerique. Je ne veux uullement IH'enclre rmrti ui pour ni 
contre la proposition arnericaine. J.\Ion devoir de President de 
cette Commission 1n'imposa d'eclaircir ~le terrain sur lequel 11ou~ 
nons trouvons et de contribuer de mes fnibles forces a une com-
r< ete orientation sur to us les rn·incipa ux faits et arguments tle-
veloppes clevant vous sur cette tres interessante et tres compli-
quee nwtiere. (Ibid., p. 833-834.) 
Vote at The l-1 ague, 190'7.·-The vote taken at The 
Hague in 1907 upon the question of inviolability of pri-
vate property at sea sho,vs in a Ineasure the modern atti-
tude upon the subject. The subject 'vas very fully dis-
cussed, the delegates were authorized by their Govern-· 
Inents, and the n1atter had been included in the pro-
gram of the Conference. Of 33 States voting, 21 States 
voted for the inviolability, 11 against, and 1 abstained 
fron1 voting. 
Those voting for 'vere Gern1any (under reservations), 
United States, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, 
Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, Haiti, Italy, Nor,vay, 
Nether lands, Persia, Roumania, Sia1n, s,veden, S·witzer-
land, and Turkey. 
T'hose voting against ·were Colombia, Spain, France, 
Great Britain, Japan, Mexico, Montenegro, Panan1a, 
Portugal, Russia, and Salvador. 
Chile abstained fro1n voting. (ibid., p. 834.) 
M. de Martens remarked that the vote ·was hardly de-
cisive, considering the maritime predominance of son1e 
of the po,vers voting in the negative. 
Upon the Brazilian proposition elabornting the as-
siinilation of the treatment of priYate property at sea 
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to the treabnent of private property on land 13 Yotes 
were in favor and 12 opposed. 
The Belgian proposition, an1ended by the Nether lands, 
looking to the mitigation and definition of 'varfare on 
sea, was taken up by a vote of 23 in favor , 3 against 
(Great Britain, Japan, and Russia), and 2 abstentions. 
This \vas subsequently "'ithclra w ..n fron1 consideration. 
The consideration of the French proposition led to no 
decisive action. 
Conclusion as to The Ii ague discttssion, 1907.-At The 
Hague in 1907 there 'vas undoubtedly a n1uch 'vider dif-
ference of opinion than 1nany had anticipated in regard 
to inviolability of private property at sea. 
This difference is shown in the report of M. Fromageot 
upon the subject. This report concludes: 
Si le maintien de l'etat de choses a ctuel parait devoir resulter 
de ceete deliberation, il est permis de penser, comme l'a dit 
!'eminent Premier Delegue de Belgique, S. Exc. l\L Beernaert, 
qu'une entente future n'a rien impossible. (Deuxierne Conference 
Internationale de la Paix, Tome I, p. 249.) 
Thus it n1ay be concluded that the po·wers of the world 
'vere not prepared in 1907 to accept the princi pie of in-
violability of private property at sea. 
The Brazilian proposition received some support, 
however, by en1bodi1nent a1nong the w·i~hes of the con-
ference of the sta te1nent of the wish " that in any case 
the powers n1ay apply, as far as possible, to war by sea 
the principles of the convention relative to the laws and 
customs of war on land." 
From the attitude of the powers in 1907 it is evident 
that agreen1ent upon the subject of inviolability of pri-
vate property at sea 'viii not be reached till other 1natters 
relating to 1naritime warfare are settled. 
Enemy ships.-If all private property at sea except 
that of the nature of contraband is to be inviolable, there 
will be a tendency to extend the list of contraband 
articles. 
It is presumed that the laws governing liability in re-
gard to blockade and unneutral service will still be op-
erative. 
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If~ however~ conversion of ene1ny private ships into 
ships of war is to be permitted on the high sea, it will be 
necessary for a belligerent to use great care in his conduct 
to\vard his opponent's private vessels. _.._1\. private v~ssel 
of one belligerent which may be met on the high sea by 
the other belligerent may claim exen1ption on the ground 
that it is a private vess·21, ·which may be the fact at the 
time. Shortly afterwards the private vessel may be con-
verted into a public war vessel. It is now not only ·liable 
to capture, but also liable to be destroyed or seized, and 
its personnel may be made prisoners of war. As there 
are as yet no rules regulating reconversion, such a vessel 
may after a time, P·2rha ps \\hen capture may be expected, 
undergo reconversion into a private vessel and be accord-
ingly exen1pt as private property. 
To include Yessels without exception in the exemption 
making private property at sea inviolable is to give an 
exemption after war is opened and vessels have sailed 
'vith a knowledge thereof, which is not given to vessels 
in a belligerent port at the outbreak of war or to vessels 
\vhich have sailed without knowledge of the war bound 
for a belligerent port. _.._1\.rticle V of the convention rela-
tive to the status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak 
of hostilities provides that-
The present conYention does not affect merchant ships whose 
build shows that they are intended for conYersion into war ships. 
At the present time few ships are of such construction 
that they 1nay not, under some circumstances, be of use 
for war even if not originally constructed for that service. _ 
-'-t\. pleasure yacht may becon1e useful as a scouting vessel, 
an ordinary privately O\\ned collier 1nay easily be con-· 
verted into a public collier, etc. 
It would seen1 necessary that if other innocent private 
property is granted exe1nption, it \Yould be on the ground 
that the innocence can be determined fron1 the nature of 
the property itself. 
Goods of the nature of contraband can be determined 
in most cases from inspection. \Vhether a vessel is to be 
~onverted from private to public can not be determined 
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by inspection. for the physical character (•I the Ye5sel 
may remain the same in priYate or in public control. The 
control is the main difference~ and this may be transferred 
by radiotelegraph or eYen on a certain date b_y preYious 
agreement! vd1ich date may not haYe arriYecl at the time 
when the Yessel was met by the belligerent of the other 
flag. 
Prof. 1r estlake~s opinion.- The late Prof. \\~ estlake: of 
Cambridge: in a note to L a tifFs~~ Effects of W ar on P rop-
erty~~! speaks of the cornrnercia l blockad~ as a war against 
neut rals. 
But if only sentiment can be gratified by limiting the war 
against the enemy· s commercial flag, the war against neutrals is 
to continue, with the certainty that commercial blockades. when 
they haYe become the sole means of paralyzing the enemy's sea 
trade, will be practically carlied as far as audacity can 'entur e 
to st rain or to \ iola te rules. 
The name in which this t opsy-tur\y po1icy i s ad,oca ted is that 
of immunity at sea of pri\ate enemy proper ty a s such, and this 
is asserted to be the extension to the sea of a principle admitted 
on land. I n truth , howe\er! the immunity· of prtvate enemy 
property is not admitted anywhere a s a bsolute. It is only ad-
mitted so far as it does not interfere with an y operations deemed 
to be useful for putting pressure on the enemy or for defense 
against him. (La tifi. Effects of War on P rol)€rty, p. 141.) 
..... ~fter a considerable discussion Pro£. \f estlake says : 
Lastly, if it can not be maintained, either l egally or as a ques-
tion of political fact , tha t individual subjects or citizens a re for-
eign to the wa r s of t heir State, there remains the plea urged on 
the ground of humanity-that they ought to be exempted as f a r 
as possible from the consequences of their solidarity. But they 
have to bear those consequences in l and war, and in na,al war 
the risk and loss are far more easily met and spread over the 
community by insurance and by the increa sed price of the cargoes 
which escape the risk. 
The conclusion is : 
(1) That there is no principle, consistent with the existence 
and nature of war, on which a belligerent can be required to a b-
stain from trying to suppress his enemy's commerce under his 
flag. 
(2) That between trying by commercial blockades to suppress 
the enemy's commerce under the neutral flag and allowing it to 
pass free under his O"\"\"'ll flag there is a glaring inconsistency. 
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( 3 ) And t hat th e subject is therefore open to be dealt with on 
the ground of the probable effects of a ny chan ge in the law. 
( Ibid, p. 151. ) 
Resum.e.-The wide consideration that has been given 
to the subject o£ immunity o£ private enemy property at 
sea shows that there are differences o£ opinion among 
different states and even within single states. These dif-
ferences are supported by arguments which are worthy 
o£ careful consideration. It is not proved to the satisfac-
t ion o£ n1any that the exe1nption of private enemy prop-
erty will shorten or even make war more humane. Some 
· maintain with strong arguments that the reverse would 
be the result. It is certain that not all private enemy 
property could consistently with the ends o£ war be 
exempt from capture. It is probable that -in some wars 
the list o£ free goods could be extended more than in other · 
wars. 
The. United States has uniformly striven for the prin-
ciple o£ exemption o£ private property at sea in time of 
war. The other states of the world have not been willing 
to adopt this principle. The United States has there-
fore been obliged to shape its policy in recent years ac-
cordingly and to accept the fact that other nations were 
not prepared to agree to exemption of private property 
at sea. 
There are many who maintain that in war, under pres-
ent conditions o£ fleets, the capture of private property 
could not be resorted to as a means o£ injuring the enemy, 
as it would be more to the disadvantage o£ the captor 
than to the belligerent :from whom capture is made. 
It is certain that the capture of private enemy property 
at sea as an object o£ war has become of much less im-
portance than formerly, and the United States may re-
gard the question as much less vital than before the 
twentieth century. Certain private property at sea could 
certainly be seized under restrictions similar to those 
governing seizure on land even i£ the doctrine o£ invio-
lability was approved. This, in £act, would result in 
treatment which would be about all that could be de-
manded i£ war upon the sea is to exist. There would 
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therefore arise, in case of the adoption o:f the principle 
o:f inviolability, a doctrine in regard to exception o:f cer-
tain classes of property :from the inviolability. On the 
other hand, the same result is gradually being brought 
about by the· agreement not to inter:fere with or not to 
capture certain classes o:f vessels or property in time of 
war on the sea. Perhaps the gradual enlargement o:f the 
list o:f exen1ptions may be niore easy to obtain and more 
in accord with rational procedure than a sweeping prohi-
bition which would be accompanied with a large list o:f 
exceptions o:f classes o:f property which would be liable 
to capture. The United States can consistently indorse 
either method of harmonizing maritime warfare with the 
principles o:f humanity, :for one method o:f procedure 
may reach the goal sought as quickly as the other, and 
the gradual development o:f a list o:f property :free :from 
capture may be practicable with the minimum o:f friction 
and difficulty. 
Oonclusion.-The United States may with propriety 
abandon the contention :for the general exemption of 
enemy private property at sea and seek agreement upon 
a certain list o:f exemptions which meet the approval of 
the states o:f the world and which may from time to time 
be expended as t4e sentiment :for exemption becomes more 
general. 
